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I"1

This appeal is taken from the provisions of a divorce
decree, findings of fact, and conclusions oi law entered by Judge
Philip R. Fishier in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Jurisdiction for appellate

review of this case is conferred by Utah Code Annotated 7 8-2a3(g) which provides for appeals from Orlders rendered in the
district court involving domestic relations cases.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 0N APPEAL
1.

Did the Trial Court err in failing to make

findings on the issues of the best interests of the children and
the respective parenting skills of the Appellant and Respondent
and in generally failing to make adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law?
2.

Did the Trial Court err in deciding the issue of

child custody at trial and then in failing to allow Appellant the
right to present his case on that issue afid in failing to allow
him to amend his Complaint pursuant to U.R.1C.P. 15(b).
3.

Did the Trial Court err in not making findings on

the issue of the best interests of the children in view of
Respondents plans to move the children out of state and in
allowing her to do so?
4.

Was the Trial Court biased and predisposed to

award custody to the Respondent?

1

5.

Did the Trial Court err in not awarding child

custody to Appellant in light of the clear preponderance of the
evidence?
6.

Did the Trial Court err in not granting more

liberal and practical visitation rights to the Appellant based
upon the best interests of the children?
7.

Did the Trial Court err in awarding child support

in the amount of $325.00 per child per month?
8.

Did the Trial Court err in its valuation and

distribution of the marital assets of the parties?
9.

Should the Court of Appeals award the Appellant

attorney's fees for the appeal?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as maybe necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence.
30-3-10 Utah Code Ann. (1953):
In any case of separation of husband and wife having
minor children, or whenever a marriage is declared void
2

or dissolved the court shall make such order for the
future care and custody of the mihor children as it maydeem just and proper.
In determining custody, the
court shall consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards
of each of the parties. The couirt may inquire of the
children and take into considefation the children's
desires regarding the future custody; however, such
expressed desires shall not be controlling and the
court may, nevertheless, determine the children's
custody otherwise.
U.R.C.P. 8(a)
A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; ...
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Sec. 1:
Nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
78-45-7(2) Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended].
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material
change in circumstances has occurred, the court in
determining the amount of prospective support, shall
consider all relevant factors including but not limited
to:
a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties
b) the relative wealth and income
of the parties;
c) the ability of the oblitjor to
earn;
d) the ability of the obligee to
earn;
e) the need of the obligee;
f) the age of the parties;
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
STATEMENT OF THE CASS
This action was commenced
3

in the Third

Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the
filing of the divorce Complaint on June 11, 1985 (R. at 2 ) . The
parties had been married on June 19, 1976 and had as issue of
that marriage two children, Anne Elizabeth Ebbert, born February
14, 1980 and Amy Ebbert, born June 16, 1982.

Each of the parties

desired to be awarded custody of both children (R. at 2-15) and
(R. at 25-26).
At the time of the filing of the Divorce Complaint
Appellant and Respondent were living in the same home.

The

following day Appellant moved approximately six city blocks from
the home where he could be near the children (R. at 591, lines 18
and 19).
Appellant's Complaint asserted a request for liberal
and minimum visitation rights upon the assumption that Respondent
would remain in the Salt Lake area (R. at 3) .

It was not until

approximately the third week in September of 1985 that Appellant
had any knowledge of Respondent's threats to leave the state with
the children

(R. at 5 7 8 ) .

In November

of 1985

it

was

conclusively determined for the first time that Respondent in
fact intended to and was proceeding with plans to leave the state
(R. at 568).
A stipulated settlement was proposed by the parties on
November 7, 1985.

The parties thereafter were unable to agree

upon the form and the substance of Findings of Facts, Conclusions
of Law, Judgment and Decree of Divorce due to the new evidence
regarding plans to remove herself and the children from the state
4

(R. at 568 lines 5-8) as well as new evidence pertaining to asset
values and liabilities (R. at 557 lines 4+7)

Said stipulation

was set aside in its entirety and the mattet was set for trial.
This case came on for trial before the Honorable Philip
R. Fishier, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and
for, Salt Lake County, State of Utah at thQ hour of 9:00 a.m. on
Friday, November 18, 19 85.

The Appellant and Respondent were

both present and represented by counsel.
During the pendency

of the action five distinct

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law were proposed (R 68-83,
115-129, 153-164, 229-239, 255-265), as well as five distinct
Judgments and Decree(s) of Divorce (R. 84-94, 100-113, 142-152,
215-228, 241-254).

Appeal is taken from the final judgment and

decree of divorce entered with the Court May 16, 1986 (R. 241254).
It is the contention of the Appellant that the Judgment
rendered was completely unfair and inequitable, reflecting a
distinct bias of the Court and denying Appellant and his children
their constitutional and parental rights.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Court awarded custody to Respondent with $650 per
month child support while the Appellant had a net income of
$2,000 per month including the value of a company-provided car.
Over 97% of the marital estate was awarded to the Respondent.
Child visitation was granted to Appellant of three
weeks during the summer and alternate holiday weekends.
5

The

Court knew that the Respondent was moving to Colorado immediately
after the trial but did not deem that fact to be relevant.

The

Respondent agreed that Appellant was a good father whom the
children loved.
The Court did not make any findings with respect to the
best interests of the children either generally nor with respect
to the proposed move to Colorado.
The Respondent had been treated for emotional problems
and it is the factual claim of the Appellant that the clear
weight of the evidence shows that the best interests of the
children would be best served by awarding
Appellant.

custody

to the

Citations to the record are made in great detail in

the sections of the brief covering the respective issues.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Trial Court erred in failing to make findings

on the issues of the best interests of the children and the
respective parenting skills of the Appellant and Respondent and
because generally there are no adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
2.

A new trial should be granted pursuant to U.R.C.P.

15(b) on the issue of child custody because the Court tried the
issue, but failed to allow the Appellant his right to present his
case on that issue, and failed to allow him to Amend

his

pleadings.
3.

The Trial Court erred in not making findings on

the issue of the best interests of the children in view of
6

Respondent's plans to move the children out of state and in
allowing her to do so.
4.

A new trial should be granted because the Court

was biased and predisposed to award custody to the Respondent.
5.

The Trial Court erred

in not awarding child

custody to Appellant in light of the clear preponderance of the
evidence.
6.

The Trial Court erred in not granting more liberal

and practical visitation rights to the Appellant based upon the
best interests of the children.
7.

The Trial Court erred in awarding child support in

the amount of $325.00 per child per month.
8.

The Trial Court erred

iri its valuation

and

distribution of the marital assets of the parties.
9.

The Court of Appeals should award the Appellant

attorney's fees for the appeal.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
MAKE FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE1 OF THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN AND
THE RESPECTIVE PARENTING SKILLS OF
THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT AND
BECAUSE GENERALLY THERE ARE NO
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FA£T AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The only reference in the Findings of Fact to parental
fitness is in paragraph 4.
Two children have been born the issue of
the marriage: Anne Ebbert, born February 14,
1980, and Amy Ebbert, born June 16, 1982.
The Defendant is a good mother apd a fit and
7

proper person to have the care, custody and
control of said children.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that such
findings are insufficient and that such a case must be remanded
for further proceedings.
In Martinez v. Martinez, (Utah 1986) 728 P.2d 994 Page
994 et. seq. the Utah Supreme Court, Per Curium, stated:
No finding was made as to the relative
parenting abilities of the parties or the
best interest of the child. Defendant argues
that this finding above is insufficient to
support the custody award or to permit
meaningful review on appeal. We agree.
The finding which the Utah Court determined was
insufficient in Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) was
almost identical in wording to the finding in this case.
Supreme Court quoted the Smith finding as follows:
4. During the course of the marriage
the parties had born as their issue on minor
child... The Court finds that Plaintiff is a
fit and proper person to be awarded the care,
custody and control of said minor child,
subject to the Defendant's reasonable rights
of visitation.
The Court went on to say:
The fact that we may review the evidence
and make our own findings in equity matters
cannot serve as an excuse for the failure
below to furnish adequate findings to ensure
that the trial court's discretionary
determination was rationally based.
As stated in Smith v. Smith, Supra,:
[I]f
our
review
of
custody
determinations is to be anything more than a
superficial exercise of judicial power, the
record on review must contain written
findings of fact and conclusions of law by
8

The

the trial judge which specially s&t forth the
reasons, based on those numerous factors
which must be weighed in determining "the
best interests of the child," and which
support the custody decision... [t]he factors
relied on by our trial judge in awarding
custody must be articuable and articulated in
the judge's written findings and conclusions.
726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986)
A mere finding that the parties are or
are not "fit and proper persons to be awarded
the care, custody and control" <^£ the child
cannot pass muster when the custody award is
challenged and an abuse of the trial court's
discretion is urged on appeal.
In Martinc z, Supra, the award of custody was vacated
and the case was remanded for appropriate Additional findings of
fact.
It is strongly recommended that in this matter that as
respecting this issue the case be remanded for a new trial on the
following grounds:
1.

The Trial Judge has retired from the

bench.
2.

That the failure to enter appropriate

findings combined with the oth^r problems
discussed in this Brief require in the veryleast a new trial.
II.
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED
PURSUANT TO U.R.C.P. 15(b) ON THE
ISSUE OF CHILD CUSTODY BECAUSE THE
COURT TRIED THE ISSUE, BUT FAILED
TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO
PRESENT HIS CASE ON THAT ISSUE, AND
FAILED TO ALLOW HIM TO AMEND HIS
PLEADINGS.
9

A.

CUSTODY WAS ALWAYS AN
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS

ISSUE

AS

The record demonstrates that custody was an issue.
The Appellant stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his
Complaint as follows:
4» Defendant should be awarded the care, custody and
control of the parties' minor children subject to the
Defendant's right to liberal visitation at minimum as
follows:
a.
Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until
Sunday at 6:00 p.m.;
b.
One night during the week from 6:00 p.m. until
9:00 p.m.;
c.
Every other red-letter holiday (e.g. July 4th,
Labor Day, etc.,) from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.;
d.

All day on alternate Thanksgiving Day;

e.
With Defendant on Christmas Eve and until noon on
Christmas day and with Plaintiff from noon on Christmas Day
and for the four (4) following days;
f.

Half day on each child's birthday;

g.
All day with Defendant on Mother's Day and with
Plaintiff on Father's Day;
h.
For one week for each month of the minor
children's summer vacation for a minimum of three (3) weeks.
i.
Any other visitation as mutually-agreed upon by
both parties hereto (R. at 2).
5.

Plaintiff should be allowed to retain all parental

entitlements with the parties minor children as if the
parties were not divorced, such as the right to attend
parent/teacher conference, and to receive notice of illness
or injury to child (R. at 2).
10

It was the Appellant's intent in these paragraphs to
place child custody in issue if he were not granted
visiting

rights.

those

The visitation rights requested were so

extensive that this was tantamount to requesting joint custody.
As of the date of the Complaint, June 10 f 1985, both
Appellant and Respondent were residents of Salt Lake City, and
Appellant thought it was Respondent's intent to remain in Salt
Lake City (R. at 578).
The Respondent placed these qi^estions in issue byfiling the following response in her answer}
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of
the Plaintiff's Complaint are denied (R. at 12).
The Respondent also filed a Counterclaim, but made no
reference to child custody in the body of her Counterclaim (R. at
12, 13). Thus Respondent violated U.R.C.P. 8(a) which requires:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; ...
Conspicuously absent from the Respondent's Counterclaim
is any language setting forth reasons why the Respondent should
be entitled to custody and, notably, the customary language to
the effect that the party so pleading is d fit and proper party
to have custody of the minor children of the* parties.
Respondent's Counterclaim make|s reference to child
custody only in paragraph 2b of the prayer which states:
b.
Awarding to her the care, custody, and control of
the minor children who are issue of the marriage, reserving
to the Plaintiff the right to visit with said children at
all reasonable times and places (R. at 14).
11

The Respondents reply contained a general denial as
follows:
Wherefore,
Plaintiff
prays that
Defendant's
C o u n t e r c l a i m be d i s m i s s e d and she t a k e n o t h i n g t h e r e b y (R.
at 25).
Thus, the question of child custody was in issue.
The parties purported to enter into a stipulation
covering all issues of the divorce including granting custody to
Respondent (R. at 302-314).
The Court set this stipulation aside entirely in its
minute entry on March 3, 1986 quoted as follows:
Court orders that the stipulation is set aside. A
trial will be held on March 27, 1986 at 9:00 A.M. (R. at
205).
Therefore, child custody was again placed in issue.
There was nothing decided between the date the stipulation was
set aside on March 3, 1986 and the date of the trial.

The Court

nevertheless stated the following at the commencement of the
trial:
The Court: All right. The Court has previously ruled
on the issues of Jurisdiction, Grounds and Custody I
believe. (R. at 406 Lines 9-11).
B.
CUSTODY WAS TRIED
The Court must have changed its mind as to whether it
had decided custody prior to trial since it purported to decide
the issue at the conclusion of the trial as evidenced by its
minute entry quoted in part as follows:

12

Defendant is awarded the custody of the children and
support of $325.00 per month per child, alimony of $1.00 a
year for two years, the home and furnishings, the Buick ans
[sic] what items she now has, plus her attorneys
costs.
(R. at 208)
The fact that the Court decided iihis issue pursuant to
the trial is further demonstrated in the Findings of Facts
wherein the Court states:
4.
Two children have been born the issue of the
marriage: Anne Ebbert, born Feb. 14, 1980, and Amy Ebbert,
born June 16, 1982. The Defendant i^ a good mother and a
fit and proper person to have the car^, custody and control
of said two children (R. at 256-257).
Further evidence that custody was tried is set forth in
the Court's Conclusions of Law as follows:
2.
The care, custody and control of the two minor
children who are issue of the marriage should be granted to
Defendant,
(R. at 262).
Some of the testimony which was allowed at trial on the
issue of child custody is set forth as follows:
Q:

And what did she tell you?

A:

That if I did not give her everything she
wanted, she would use her parents1 money to
take the children so far away I would never
see them.

(R. at 578, lines 18-21)
Q:

And what were you discussing at that time?

A:

The same thing.

Q:

And what was said to yob at that time?

A:

If I did not give her everything she wanted,
she would be using her parents1 money to make
sure that I never savf the children again.
And I believe at that point she had mentioned
Europe.

Q:

Any other conversations of that substance?
13

A:

Not off the top of my head, no.
pretty well.

Those stuck

(R. at 579, lines 11-18)
A:

Well, we know where children usually go in
this state in a divorce. They go to Mama,
and I knew that Barbara's parents with their
millions of dollars would give her whatever
she wanted and that her threat could be
carried through without any problem at all
and there was not a thing I could do about
it.

(R. at 579, lines 23-25, and R. at 580, lines 1-3)
The following was heard regarding parental skills and
the best interest of the children:
Q:

(By Mr. Hanson) Mr. Ebbert, Mrs. Ebbert testified
that she felt that you had excellent parenting
skills; that you were good with the children; that
you had a good relationship, and these kind of
things. Do you agree with her characterization of
your relationship with the kids and your abilities
as a parent?

A:

She has said repeatedly that I'm the best father
she's ever seen, and I agree with her.

Q:

What do you do with the children when you've been
visiting with them?

A:

This week we went to the zoo, went up and saw the
animals and played with them.
And we read a
couple of books. I have pretty much taught them
to read. I have been helping Anne with her math.
We've got workbooks, and they come over and they
can't wait to get their workbooks out to learn how
to read and write, add, subtract -- got Ann
dividing now.
Take them to the museum up at the university of
Utah. We go to the park and play, fly kites,
church.

Q:

Do you do anything fun with them?

A:

It sounds silly, but I've always felt like maybe
the best example a parent can show a child is
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their time.
Q:

And you enjoy the time spent with them?

A:

Absolutely. And I always have, because this stuff
didn't start after the separation.

(R. at 618, lines 13-25, and R. at 619, lin^s 1-13)
As to provisions for the children the transcript reads:
A.

Well, as Mr. Cowley pointed out, I have no idea
where child support is going to end, and I hope in
July I'm going to be able to move out of the
apartment and into the house, the rental property.
At that point I have to incur a bedroom set for
the children. I have a washer and dryer, I have a
refrigerator I have to purchase — like that.

(R. at 612, lines 19-25)
Discussion regarding a specific visitation schedule was
heard at R. at 582, lines 10-22.
Further evidence heard relating t|D custody reads:
A.

We really have not had a problem with the
visitation scenario, other than items like Barbara
not being there, the kids not being ready. And
then they are demanding that I make another trip
back over to deliver them. If I refuse, I get to
keep them for another night Which tickles the heck
out of me so I don't care on that. But I do want
it as specific as possible.

(R. at 583)
C.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED
EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF CHILD
CUSTODY
Since the record shows that child custody was not
decided before trial, was not stipulated to and was decided at
trial, the court was obligated to allow Appellant to introduce
all admissible

evidence which he offered
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and to hold a

preliminary hearing on child custody.
do.

This the Court failed to

30-3-10 U.C.A. (1953) provides that the Court must fully

consider the best interests of the children:
In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and
the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties.
The Court deliberately excluded testimony and evidence
as demonstrated

in the trial transcript in the following

respects:
Q: (byMr. Hanson):

But you understand that in so doing, that the
children are going to be leaving someone
behind who's very important in their life?"

A:(Respondent)
That someone may see them anytime he wishes.
(R. at 523, lines 7-10)
The questioning continued
The Court:

But you understand that its going to be more
difficult for Mr. Ebbert to see them in terms
of frequency when they're living in Colorado,
as opposed to living in Salt Lake?

Mr. Cowley:

I object, Your Honor. This is just a waste
of time. We acknowledged you can drive to
Denver.

The Court:

Sustained.

(R. at 523, lines 11-17)
With respect to the beneficiaries of Appellant's life
insurance policy the following discussion was held:
Q. (by Mr.
Hanson)
A.

You want to provide for the kids in the event
of your death, do you not?
Absolutely. And if -- if everything were
paid to Barbara —
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Mr. Cowley:

Now w a i t

a minute

I'ljL o b j e c t .

That's

not

responsive to any questions asked.
The Court:

Sustained.

(R. at 560, lines 5-11)
The Court prevented further testimony with respect to
the effects of the Respondent's move out of state upon both the
children and the Appellant shown

at R. at 568, lines 22-25, and

R. at 165, lines 1-10.
Where Mr. Hanson asked the Appellant a question with
regard to the Respondent's care, parenting techniques and quality
of care she gives the children, Mr. Cowley's following objection
was sustained:
Mr. Cowley:

I am going to object because I think this is
all irrelevant and immaterial, a big waste of
time.

(R. at 691, lines 22-24)
evidence
The court had a duty

to allow

complete
provides

pursuant to Rule 15(b).

The first part of Rule 15(b)

the following:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause theta to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues.
In refusing the evidence and testimony regarding child
custody the court effectively precluded bpth Appellant and the
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children from their constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection.

U.S. Cont. amend XIV §1:

nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
In Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 652 (1975)
the Supreme stated:
[A] father, no less than a mother, has a
constitutionally protected right to the
" c o m p a n i o n s h i p , c a r e , c u s t o d y , and
management" of the children he has sired and
raised.
Since the Court would not hear the evidence relative to
a child custody award there must have been some presumption of
the Court upon which the award was made.

In the case of Vlandis

v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452, (1973) the U.S. Supreme Court held
that it is a denial of due process to make:
a permanent and irrebuttable presumption...
When that presumption is not necessarily or
universally true in fact, and when the state
has a reasonable alternative means of making
the crucial determination.
In the case at hand a reasonable alternative means of
making such a crucial determination as the award of child custody
would have been to allow all relevant evidence and testimony at
trial.
D.
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED ON THE
ISSUE OF CHILD CUSTODY BECAUSE THE COURT
ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
AMEND HIS COMPLAINT AS PROVIDED FOR IN
U.R.C.P. 15(b).
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The second part of Rule 15(b) bf the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that:
...If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the. pleadings to be amended
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting pftrty fails to satisfy
the court that the admission of sluch evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary,
to enable the objecting party to meet $uch evidence.
The following

discussion

was had at trial

and

demonstrates that in the instant case evidjence was presented at
trial and was objected to at the trial on tjhe ground that it was
not within the issues made by the pleadingts.

It also evidences

the appropriate motion which was made by qounsel in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 15(b) to amend the pleadings to
conform to the evidence:
The Court:

Is custody an issue?

Mr. Hanson:

Your Honor, the reason I feel t h a t I have t o
go f o r w a r d w i t h t h i & f o u n d a t i o n i s t o
p r e s e r v e t h e record on t h i s as t o the f a c t
t h a t s h e ' s moving t o Colorado, and obviously
w e ' r e not t h r i l l e d about t h a t and I think
t h a t we need t o e s t a b l i s h t h e r e a s o n s why
we're n o t .

The Court:

Answer this question--Can only be answered
"Yes" or "No". Is custody an issue?

Mr. Hanson:

Yes.

Mr. Cowley:

May I r e s p o n d by c a l l i n g t h e C o u r t ' s
a t t e n t i o n t o the Complaint t h a t they f i l e d
where t h e i r only a l l e g a t i o n i s t h a t custodyshould be awarded t o t h e Defendant; and i f he
wants t o change custody games, i t s a l i t t l e
late.

The Court:

Where did you put custody an issue?
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Mr. Hanson:

Today.

The Court:

And the pleadings are framed so that — as
far as I can see, the pleadings are framed
that there's no dispute that the Defendant
should have custody. When we thought the
case would settle, had settled, the Defendant
was to have custody.

Mr. Hanson:

That's right.

The Court:

And that today you want to make custody an
issue?

Mr. Hanson:

That's correct.

The Court:

Alright.

Mr. Hanson:

May I say why and what my intention is?

The Court:

Yes.

Mr. Hanson:

My i n t e n t i o n i s t h i s :
t h i s complaint was
f i l e d , I b e l i e v e in June or J u l y of 1985;
t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s have changed
dramatically in terms of what we had in our
knowledge a t t h a t time; and t h a t if I am able
t o l a y , by testimony of Mr. Ebbert, h i s
concerns regarding custody, t h a t I would
of c o u r s e , s u b j e c t t o Your H o n o r ' s
r u l i n g thereon, make a motion t o amend
t h e p l e a d i n g s t o conform w i t h t h e
e v i d e n c e t h a t ' s been b r o u g h t f o r t h .
That i s the purpose of answering your
question affirmatively that, yes,
custody i s an i s s u e , Your Honor.

The Court:

A l r i g h t . Well I am not going t o allow you t o
amend the pleadings a t t h i s l a t e d a t e .
If
custody were an i s s u e , you could have had
e v a l u a t i o n s done, home s t u d i e s done. We have
not done any of t h a t , so I w i l l s u s t a i n the
objection.
This move t o Colorado I d o n ' t
believe i s nearly as s i g n i f i c a n t as you do, I
guess, Mr. Hanson. Proceed.

Mr. Hanson

May I t h e n go forward regarding the - - Mr.
Cowley's objection regarding what I expect t o
e l i c i t from Mr. Ebbert about the q u a l i t y of
the care and the nature of the care in Mrs.
E b b e r t ' s custody?

You made your record.
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The Court:

None--

Mr. Hanson:

What I'm wondering: Aire you sustaining his
objection and cutting me off?

The Court:

Sustaining the objection. Custody is not an
issue. She — I believe in her pleadings you
say she should be the custodial parent. The
last time we tried to settle the case he said
she should be the custodial parent. I think
that's it.

(R. at 619, line 25 - R. at 622, line 7)
Since custody was an issue and Respondent's counsel
objected upon the ground that the issue was not raised within the
pleadings, the Court should have allowed the motion to amend the
pleadings to conform to the evidence ^nd a continuance if
necessary as set forth in the conclusonaty provision of Rule
15(b) which states:
...the court shall grant a continuance if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to
meet such evidence.
In the case of Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman

& Co.

Commodities, (CA 8th, 1982) 668 F.2d 1193 a rule 15(b) motion was
permitted even after the close of evidenc^.

Brown v. Ward, (A

4th, 1970] 438 F.2d 1285 holds that pleadings may be amended even
after verdict to make them conform to the proof.
In the case of General Insurance Company v. Carnicero
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 the Supreme COurt of Utah held that
where an issue was tried by implied consent, the trial court
erred in denying defendants ' motion to amend their answer in
order to conform to the evidence.
On January 8, 1987 the Suprem^ Court of New York,
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Appellate Division, Third Department found that the Supreme
Court, Trial Term, erred when it denied Appellant's motion to
conform the pleadings to the proof, which motion was made at the
end of the trial.

Judgment was reversed, and the matter remitted

to the Supreme Court for a new trial.

See Jean F. O'Sullivan,

Appellant, v. John J. 0'Sullivan, Respondent, 510 NYS, 2nd p.288.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING
FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN IN VIEW
OF RESPONDENTS PLANS TO MOVE THE
CHILDREN OUT OF STATE AND IN
ALLOWING HER TO DO SO.
The Respondent told the Appellant during the divorce
proceedings that if he didn't give her what she wanted bystipulation that she would take the children so far away that he
would not be able to visit them.

The Appellant declined and the

Respondent took the children to Colorado Springs.
The Appellant testified as follows at trial:
Q: (By Mr.
Hanson)
A: (By Mr.
Ebbert)

Q:

And what did she tell you?
That if I did not give her everything she
wanted, she would use her parents* money to
take the children so far away I would never
see them.
Now, did this similar type of discussion take
place on another occasion?

A:

Yes.

Q:

When would t h a t have been?

A:

I would g u e s s November, f i r s t p a r t
November, f i r s t and middle of November.
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of

Q

Of 1985?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Where were you?

A:

In the residence.

Q:

Who was present?

A:

Barbara and I.

Q:

And what were you discu$sing at that time?

A:

The same thing.

Q:

And what was said to you at that time?

A:

If I did not give her everything she wanted,
she would be using her parents• money to make
sure that I never saw the children again.
And I believe at that point she had mentioned
Europe.

Q:

Any other conversations of that substance?

A:

Not off the top of my head, no.
pretty well.

Q:

And what was your state of mind after hearing

Those stuck

that from Mrs. Ebbert?
A:

Total frustration.

Q:
A:

In what regard?
Well, we know where cjhildren usually go in
this state in a divorce. They go to Mama,
and I knew that Barbara's parents with their
millions of dollars would give her whatever
she wanted and that her threat could be
carried through without any problem at all
and there was not a thing I could do about
it.

at 578 Line 18 to R. at 580 Line 3)
This testimony went wholly uncontradicted

by the

pondent.
Mrs. Ebbert was actually planning and did in fact move
23

to Colorado shortly after the trial.
Q.

(By Mr, Hanson) Mr. Ebbert, in light of the
fact -- based on what you have said under my
examination, in light of the fact that Mrs.
Ebbert appears inevitably as going to
Colorado, you feel that it's important to lay
down a specific visitation schedule?

A.

Absolutely.

(R. at 582 Lines 10-15)
The law in Utah and the majority rule is that a child
should not be removed from the jurisdiction of the Court which is
hearing the divorce proceedings and that prior to any proposed
removal a specific finding must be made that it is in the best
interests of the child to do so.
The Court in the Findings of Fact made only the
following statement regarding custody:
23. The Defendant (Respondent/Wife)
currently resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, but is
intending to move during the summer of 1986 to Colorado Springs.
No finding whatsoever was made on the important issue
as to whether or not it was in the best interests of the children
to be taken to Colorado.
The law on this point is discussed at length in
McGonigle v. McGoniqle, 112 Colo. 569, 151 P.2d 977 at page 978.
Where the custody of a child is awarded in a
divorce proceeding, the child becomes the ward of the
court, and it is against the policy of the law to
permit its removal to another jurisdiction unless its
well-being and future welfare would be better subserved
thereby. State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, Mo. Sup.,
257 S,W. 1047. While ordinarily the custody of a child
should not be awarded to a nonresident, nor to one
contemplating immediate removal from the state, it,
nevertheless, is well established that when it is
conducive to the child's best interests, the court may
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permit it to be removed from the jurisdiction. Williams
v. Williams, 110 Colo. 473, 135 P.2d 1016, 1019. See,
also, Fouts v. Pendrick, 111 Colo- 141, 137 P.2d 1019,
and Fateir v. Hugg, 112 Colo. 213, 147 P.2d 477. The
sum of the doctrine announced in the Missouri case and
in our decisions, is illuminatingl|y stated in 27
C.J.S., Divorce, page 1179, /313..
In affirming an
order of removal of the child involved in the Williams
case to another jurisdiction we were at pains to
emphasize the fact that the "learned trial judge at all
times proceeded upon the principle that best interest
of the child should be the controlling factor in
determining the placing of her custody," and resolved
the issue on that premise. Under this established rule
and the circumstances attending, the motion for removal
of the child to another jurisdiction should have been
denied, and, subject to what we shall say in the next
paragraph, that will be the order on remand.
There is not an abundance of Uta^i law on this subject
and the time is ripe for a further elaboration by the Court on
this issue.
Utah seems to subscribe to the

majority view as

expressed by the Colorado Court in McGOnigle, Supra as was
expressed by Justice Crockett in Curry v. ^urry,

7 Utah 2d 198,

321 P.2d 939 at pages 942 and 943 (1958).
The precept is well recognized that the trial
court is vested with broad equitable powers in divorce
matters and that its judgment will not be disturbed
lightly, nor at all unless the evidence clearly
preponderates against his findings, or there has been a
plain abuse of discretion, or a mani est injustice or
inequity is wrought. Applying suchj rule, it is our
conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed, but
with this modification:
The plaintiff should be
required to retain the children in this jurisdiction
until the further order of court so that the defendant
may enjoy full privileges, of visiting and maintaining
the best possible paternal relationship with them."
The lower court misperceived the law on this point when
it stated:
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As I understand it, she can relocate if she wants
to move to Colorado Springs because she likes mountains
on the west side of the valley as opposed to living
here and having them on the east side of the valley
that would seem that's appropriate. She can move where
she wants to move. (Judge Fishier R. at 569 lines 21-25
through R. at 570 line 1 ) .
And I understand the situation.
It's a bad
situation, but it kind of goes without saying. We're
in the middle of a divorce. We just have to work
something out. I will just have to fashion an order
that's going to take that into account.
I'd be
surprised if he were happy with the situation. (Judge
Fishier R. at 570 lines 2-7).
The Court should enter the same order that was entered
in the Curry case requiring that the children be maintained in
this jurisdiction or it should reverse and grant custody to the
Appellant.
IV.
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED
BECAUSE THE COURT WAS BIASED AND
PREDISPOSED TO AWARD CUSTODY TO THE
RESPONDENT.
It is apparent from the Affidavit of attorney Kenn M.
Hanson (appended hereto) that the Court was predisposed to award
custody to the Respondent.
Commentary in the publication Criteria for Deciding
Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 Fam. L.Q.I
(Spring 1984), at page 41 provides:
On a subject as fundamentally important as
the custody and welfare of children, each
case on appeal should receive close scrutiny.
A careful review is especially important
since a custody determination may be
influenced by the biases of the trial judge.
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In the case of In re; Marriage of Murray, 622 P.2d
1288, 1291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) the Court found that if the
judge's comments suggest an improper bias, there is strong need
for independent review of the case by the Appellate Court.
Further commentary regarding Coujrt bias from Criteria
for Deciding Child Custody, supra, page 3 includes:
..And for judges, custody cases bring
forth more of their emotion and personal
background than almost any other type of case
they deal with.
The trial transcript reflects the Court bias in the
following instances:
At the commencement of trial the pourt stated:
All right. The Court has previously ruled on
the issues of jurisdiction, grounds and
custody, I believe.
(R. at 406)
This was notwithstanding the ojbvious dissention as
shown by the fact that four previous findings of fact and
conclusions of law were entered with the Court but were unable to
be effectuated (R. at 68-83, 115-129, 153-164, and 229-239).
Similarly, a stipulated settlement had to be set aside in its
entirety as the parties were unable to agrde (R. at 205).
The Court further expressed its tiias as follows:
This move to Colorado I don't believe is as
important as you do, I guess, Mr. Hanson.
Proceed.
(R. at 621, lines 19-20)
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V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
AWARDING CHILD CUSTODY TO APPELLANT
IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE.
In the case of Tanttila v. Tanttila, (Colo. 1965) 382
P.2d 798 the Colorado Supreme Court reversed an order of the
lower court which had granted the mother the right to remove the
children to another state.
The Supreme Court of Colorado found two factors to be
of paramount importance:
1.

2.

The children's feelings for their father, and

How t h e removal may a f f e c t

the

father's

a b i l i t y to v i s i t the c h i l d r e n .
The Court in Tanttila , Supra, said at page 800:
The mother testified concerning the
relationship between the father and the
children as follows:
They love him very much. He loves them.
*** I have told you that they loved their
father and they have been very happy to be
with him here.
The Respondent Mrs. Ebbert, testified to the same
effect.

She said:

Q. (By Mr.
Hanson):
A. (By Mrs.
Ebbert)

You said that Ed is a good father.
no question about his abilities?

There's

No.

Q.

Does he have a close relationship with the
children?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

Does he read to them and help them with
homework, and these kind of things?

A.

Yes, I believe he does.

Q.

Would you say that the kids love their
father?

A,

Yes, they do.

(R. at 521 line 18 to R. at 522 line 3)
Q.

(By Mr.

Hanson):

A. (By Mrs.
Ebbert):

I s i t b e n e f i c i a l , i n your o p i n i o n , Mrs.
E b b e r t , t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n have
that
r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h i s type of r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t
you've d e s c r i b e d , with t h e i r f a t h e r ?
I think they need to be with their father,
but I think they need to be with me.

(R. at 522 lines 14-18)
Mr. Ebbert was of the opinion that a move to Colorado
would effectively preclude his ability to visit the children.
Q. (By Mr.
Hanson):

A. (By Mr.
Ebbert):

In the event that Mrs. Ebbert does move to
Colorado -- and it certainly sounds like she
will -- who do you think should bear the
expense of having the children come and see
you?
If I have to bear it, the children won't see
me.

(R. at 570 Lines 8-12)
Under exactly these circumstances the Court in Tanttila
concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to allow the mother
to take the children out of state.

This Court should so rule.

In the case of Hale v Hale, 429 NE 2d. 340 the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals reviewed a decision by the lower
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court on the issue of custodial parent removal.

It noted that

even though the findings on this issue were extensive the lower
court had not considered all of the relevant factors and remanded
the case for further proceedings.

The court outlined seven

issues which should be considered.

They are set forth and

discussed as follows:
1.

The integrity of the motives of the custodial

parent (page 344).
Here it has been shown that Respondent, Mrs. Ebbert,
had an improper motive in that she was using this as a threat to
gain her terms of settlement.
2.

The children's

attachment

to community

and

relatives therein (page 342).
The children, Anne age 6 and Amy age 4, had lived in
the same neighborhood all of their lives (R. at 257). They had a
good relationship with the Appellant's parents (R. at 336). They
had a good relationship with their friends and neighborhood
children (R. at 455 and R. at 434). Ann was attending school at
Rowland Hall (R. at 455) and Amy was in preschool (R. at 434).
3.

The well-being of the custodial parent.

The only testimony on this subject other than that
previously cited was that the Respondent moved to Colorado to be
nearer to her parents.
The

Respondent

testified

significant emotional problems.

that

she was

having

Her well-being would be best

subserved by not having the responsibility of two young minor
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children.

Her testimony regarding her ^motional problems is

quoted as follows:
Q. (By Mr.
Hanson)
A. (By Mrs.
Ebbert)

Now, why did you go see Linnel? What was the
reason for going to see her originally?
I couldn't talk right.

Q.

You were referred to her by a physician,
weren' t you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You were having problems; you had gone to see
the neurosurgeon
b e c a u s e you
were
experiencing problems, r i g h t ?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that you in fact copld not speak and --?

A.

I was blanking out, yes,.

Q.

That's the reason why you were referred to
Linnel, correct?

A.

Yes.

A neurosurgeon.

tLt was stress.

Q.

And were these sessions geared toward helping you
with that particular problem?

A.

Originally, yes.

(R. at 500, lines 15-25 and R. at 501, lines 1-7)
4.

Prospective advantages of quality of life in the

new community (page 344).
The only evidence on this question was that there were
some children in the new neighborhood of the same age and that
there would be a new elementary school in the fall of 1987. (R.
at 511, 512).

Certainly this does not show any prospective

advantage of life in the new community.
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5.

The desires of the children (page 345).

No evidence was received (R. at 624).
6.

Can visitation and support be made to meet the

needs of the noncustodial parent and child for good contact?
(Page 342).
This issue was not considered in the Findings or
Conclusions.

Mr. Ebbert said a move would make visitation

impossible (R. at 570).
7.

Will the custodial parent abide by the visitation

schedule? (page 344).
The Appellant had already had some problems with
visitation (R. at 583 and R. at 575).

This Court should adopt

the Massachusetts standard and find that the Respondent has
failed to meet it since there are no findings on any of these
issues.
Since the presumption is that the children should
remain within the state of the jurisdiction of the Court unless
and until the custodial parent shows that it would be in the best
interests of the children to be removed from the state the Court
should reverse and grant custody of the children to the Appellant
because the record is devoid of evidence and findings to support
an exception to the general rule.

Failing that the case should

be remanded for a new trial on this issue.
An examination of the foregoing citations and the
record in general demonstrates that the Appellant is clearly the
better parent to have custody under the circumstances and it is
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in the best interests of the children that he should be granted
custody.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING MORE LIBERAL AND PRACTICAL
VISITATION RIGHTS TO THE APPELLANT
BASED UPON THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILDREN
Exhibit "A" to the Divorce Decree sets forth visitation
rights and essentially grants the following visitation rights.
1.

Three weeks in the summer.

2.

Alternating official holiday weekends throughout
the year.

It also provides:
The Plaintiff is expected to dxercise the
visitation rights herein granted to him in a
reasonable and responsible fashion. If the
children are ill or if there are other valid
reasons why the defendant believes a
particular visitation is not in the best
interest of the children or will be hazardous
or threatening to their physical or mental
health then the Defendant may decline the
visitation rights by giving reasonable
written notice thereof to the plaintiff and
setting forth the reason therefore.
This determination essentially allows visitation at the
sole discretion of the Respondent.
The Appellant

asks that the Court exercise

its

equitable powers and take judicial notice of the following facts
from his affidavit attached hereto.
1.

That the Respondent claiming the benefit of the

foregoing clause has verbally declined th^ Appellant visitation
rights on fourteen occasions.
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2.

That if Appellant brings the children to his home

in Midvale to visit them it costs him $588.00 per weekend.
3.

If he visits them in a motel in Colorado Springs

it costs him $240.00 per weekend.
The Court found that the Appellant was making $2,000.00
net per month including his car (R. at 330, lines 1-2).
Based upon these circumstances it is essentially
impossible for the Appellant to visit the children on weekends
and therefore his visitation is limited to three weeks per year.
Courts have consistently held that it is error to order
that the right of visitation shall be at the discretion of the
person having custody of the child.

Willey v Willeyf 253 Iowa

1294, 115 NW2d 833; McCourtney v McCourtney, 205 Ark. Ill, 168 SW
2d 200.
Significant adverse affects have been found to impact
upon children where child visitation has been limited.

See a

five year study entitled Child Protective Divorce Laws:

A

Response to the Effects of Parental Separation on Children,
Family Law Quarterly, Volume XVIII, November 3, Fall 1983.
VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
CHILD SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$325.00 PER CHILD PER MONTH
The C o u r t
month p e r

child.

below a w a r d e d
This

was

an

the
abuse

Respondent
of

$325.00

discretion

and

per
a

m i s a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e law as w i l l be s e t f o r t h below.
The s t a n d a r d of review for c h i l d s u p p o r t p r o c e e d i n g s
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is

that the decision of the trial court ma^ be set aside if the
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or if there has
been an abuse of discretion.
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981).

Christensen vs. Christensen, 628

78-45-7(2) of the Utah Code Annotated

provides that in determining the amount ot child support to be
paid, the court is to consider the following factors:
(a) the standard of living ahd situation
of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
As will be seen from the record, the Court made no
findings as to any of the factors listed above, and instead
substituted its own formula for calculation of child support,
(Record at 330) which calculation has no bksis in law and was an
abuse of discretion.

An examination of the record also reveals

that the evidence presented did not justify the child support
award which was granted.

When the factors listed in Utah Code

Annotated 78-45-7(2) are applied to the facits a much lower amount
is mandated.
The first factor to be considered in determining child
support is the "standard of living and situation of the parties."
The record reveals that the parties experienced an affluent
lifestyle (R. at 413, 423, 428, 429, and 443, Defendant's Exhibit
"2").
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The second factor to be considered in the determination
of child support is the relative wealth and income of the
parties.

The record

reveals that the Respondent was far

wealthier than the Appellant and had far greater income than did
the Appellant.
The Respondent testified that her parents relieved her
of any obligation to make a mortgage payment on the parties'
residence (R. at 436), provided a school wardrobe for the oldest
child (R. at 436) and contributed $9,056.00 towards the payment
of the Respondents personal bills and paid over $3,000.00 in one
month (R. at 446) for the purchase of the Respondent's own
wardrobe.

The Respondent testified that she did not have to work

and had no qualms about quitting her job because she knew her
parents would provide her with the income she needed (R. at 485).
The Respondent also testified that her new residence to
which she expected to move subsequent to the trial was worth
$158,000.00 (R. at 465).

Obviously the Respondent had a high

standard of living and a large amount of discretionary funds,
which is a key factor in determining the needs and income of the
parties. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
The Appellant, on the other hand had a far lower
standard of living.

There was no dispute that the Appellant's

base net monthly income the prior year, 1985, was approximately
$1,500 as testified to by the Respondent (R. at 425) with bonuses
ranging in gross amounts of between $5,000.00 to $10,000.00
annually (R. at 426).
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Although the Court found that th£ Appellant had a net
income of $2,000.00 a month, his finding was erroneous based on
the Appellant's testimony that his tax status had changed and
would result in a lower take home pay than he was experiencing at
the time of trial (R. at 611).
A second ground on which the Colurt erroneously found
the Appellant's net income to be $2,000.00 a month was his
inclusion of the Appellant's company car as income to the
Appellant. (Record at 330). The Appellant l(iad a company car, but
although this may have reduced his expenses it did not change his
income.
Assuming

a net income of substantially

$2,000.00 per month, the Appellant was clearly
financial situation than was the Respondent.

less than

in a worse

The Appellant

testified that he had expenses of $3,191.34 per month, and his
testimony was unrefuted (R. at 132). In addition to the expenses
included in that amount are additional expenses ordered by the
Court for the benefit of the children (R. at 330, 331).

The

addition of expenses for life insurance and| medical insurance for
the benefit of the children create further financial hardship for
the Appellant.
The Court has placed the Plaintiff in a position where
his expenses exceed his income.

The pourt in Hamilton v.

Hamilton, 494 P.2d 287 (Utah 1972) stated that the Court may not
place a burden upon the husband that he would "probably be unable
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to meet in the future."

The Court has done exactly that in the

case at bar.
In light of the above facts and the clear preponderance
of the evidence that the Appellant made substantially less than a
net amount of $2,000.00 a month, it was inequitable for the judge
to require the Appellant to pay $325.00 per child per month in
child support.

The evidence was clear that the Respondent was in

a far better financial

situation

than was the Appellant,

therefore, the Court's ruling on child support was erroneous
under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7.
The third and fourth factors mentioned in 78-45-7
involve the ability of both parties to earn.
earning ability has been discussed above.

The Appellant's
The Respondent was

earning a gross amount of $10,800.00 per year, however, the
Respondent had no need to work whatsoever since she was being
supported by her parents (R. at 485).

The Appellant's earning

ability was obviously miscalculated and overstated by the judge
which suggests that the amount of child support awarded by the
judge should be reduced to reflect his actual net earnings as
established by the record.
The fifth factor to be considered in determining the
amount of child support is the need of the obligee.

No evidence

was presented demonstrating the need of the Respondent and no
consideration of this factor seems to have been given whatsoever.
As stated above, the Respondent's testimony established that she
had a much higher standard of living than did the Appellant.
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The

judge himself commented on the disparity between the parties when
he said "I have a sneaking suspicion that these children are
going to live better than he is," (R. at 3^3). As stated above,
the Respondent testified that nearly every one of the children's
financial needs were supplied by her parents including their
clothing, their school tuition, the mortgage payments for their
home and the car payment for their mother'^ car.

The Respondent

did not document their food, medical expenses or other expenses
but lumped the same together with her own rather expensive dental
work

(R. at 449) and household expense^.

In light of the

Respondent's failure to demonstrate need it was clearly an abuse
of discretion for the judge to award child support based on a
formula combining the estimated future net income of the parties
rather than the actual need of the Respondent.
The final factors to be considered under U.C.A. 78-45-7
are the ages of the parties and the responsibility of the obligor
to support others; these factors are not relevant to the case at
bar and since neither the Appellant nor the Respondent has an
obligation to support others.
Case law demonstrates the importance of applying the
above factors to the situation of the parties.

In the case of

Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Uta|h 1985) the evidence
demonstrated that the custodial parent ma<3e $32,000.00 per year
and the non-custodial parent $7,000.00.

The court found no need

on the part of the custodial parent and therefore, made no award
for the support of the three minor children).
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In Graziano v. Graziano, 321 P.2d 931 (Utah 1958), the
court considered the fact that the custodial parent was being
supported by a wealthy family which provided for the needs of
herself and the minor child of the parties, and awarded her only
$50.00 per month in child support although she had no independent
earning ability at the time.

The non-custodial parent had a very

low income and the court, considering the relative standard of
lives so that the parties and their children can pursue their
lives in as happy and useful a manner as possible.
The Court continues on to say:
If it appears that the decree is so
discordant with the equitable allocation that
it will more likely lead to further
difficulties and distress than to serve the
desired objective, then a reappraisal of the
decree must be undertaken.
Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979).
Such is the situation in the case at bar.

Based on the

Appellant's testimony that the children's needs amount to $300.00
per month (R. at 583, the Court should reverse the lower court's
ruling and modify the Court's award of child support from $325.00
per month per child to $150.00 per month per child because the
Court's award of child support was an abuse of discretion and
should be overturned.
The Court also erred

in awarding alimony to the

Respondent for the reasons set forth above that the Respondent
was not in need of support from the Appellant to enable her to
maintain the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.
Applying Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) to the case
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at bar we can see that the Court failed to apply the three
factors set forth in the Savage, Supra case and the Respondent
failed to prove need.

Therefore, it was $rr to award alimony,

even in a nominal amount.
VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE
MARITAL ASSETS OF THE PARTIES.
The Court made several errors| in its division of
assets, including its improper valuation of the assets, and its
award of 97% of the estate to the RespondentThe problem of valuation involves two sub-issues; first
failure to make findings based on the evidence, and second, the
Court's

entry

of

findings which were against the

clear

preponderance of the evidence.
The values of several major items and categories of
items were disputed at trial.

The Court pnade a ruling at the

conclusion of the trial as to who the assets should be awarded to
but the Court did not rule on the values of the items (R. at
329).

The Respondent's attorney prepared the Findings of Fact

inserting in them his own values for the assets.

When these

figures were challenged by the Appellantj, the Court responded
that "according to my notes, the numbers I think are correct."
R. at 386.
The numbers, in fact, are not codrect, and some of them
are entirely unsupported by the evidencfe.
examples are the following:
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The most blatant

the household

goods of the

Respondent were valued at $10,000.00 by the Respondent, Defendants Exhibit "1". Yet the findings that the Court signed found
these items to be worth $5,000.00 . On what basis did the judge
find those items to be worth half of what the
testified that they were worth?

Respondent

The record is devoid of any

support for that figure.
Another example is the Respondent's personal clothing
and jewelry.
at 101)

She testified at trial it was worth $5,000.00 (R.

yet the judge found they were worth zero, for which

there is no basis.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is that the
Court actually paid very little attention to the evidence and
simply divided the property without regard to its value.

When

specific valuations supplied by the Respondent were objected to
by the Appellant, the Court conveniently found that the figures
conformed to his notes.

This was not proper and was clearly

prejudicial to the Appellant as will be set forth below.
The second issue as to valuation is whether the Court's
findings as to the values of the assets were against the clear
weight of the evidence.
To begin with, the Court found the value of the
property at 7389 South 1710 East known as the "marital residence"
to be $129,000.00 based on the testimony of the Respondent that
$129,000.00 was the purchase price (R. at 465).

This was in

spite of the fact that the Appellant testified that major
improvements were made during the marriage of the parties (R. at
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468, 469, 546, 547). The Appellant testified that in his opinion
the property was worth $150,000.00 (R. at 546).

The Appellant

also testified that the parties had made only a few of the
mortgage payments and that the house was ijn fact gifted to the
parties entirely (R. at
as to these

429, 543 and 545). There was no dispute

facts, therefore

it was against

the

clear

preponderance of the evidence to find t;he property had not
increased in value.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is that the
Court actually paid very little attention to the evidence and
simply divided the property without regard to its value.

When

specific valuations supplied by the Respondent were objected to
by the Appellant, the Court conveniently tiound that the figures
conformed to his notes.

This was not proper and was clearly

prejudicial to the Appellant as will be set forth below.
The second issue as to valuation lis whether the Court's
findings as to the values of the assets were against the clear
weight of the evidence.
Another item which was disputed was the valuation of
the property at the address of 7238 South 1(710 East known as "the
Rental property."

The Respondent testified that she felt it was

worth $79,000.00 (R. at 472) although she expressed some doubt
that the property would sell at that price ($79,000.00) when she
stated "I felt like it would be good luck if we got that much
($79,000.00) for it." (R. at 472). The Appellant testified that
the property was worth $73,500.00 based on the offer he had
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received

(R. at 552).

He also testified that the mortgage

balance was $48,000.00 (R. at 553) while the Respondent listed it
as $44,000.00 in her Exhibits

(see Defendant's Exhibit 1 ) ,

undervaluing the mortgage by $4,000.00.

In addition

the

Appellant testified that an obligation of $25,000.00 existed
against the rental property in favor of Al and Justine Porter (R.
at 554).

Although it was the Appellant's understanding at the

time of the trial that the debt had been extinguished, he also
testified that the understanding was oral only, and he had no
document to prove the extinguishment of that debt (R. at 554).
Therefore, the Appellant received the property subject to the
spectre of a demand for $25,000.00.
Respondent.

This was not disputed by the

Under these circumstances the Court should have

reduced the value of the rental property by $25,000.00.

In

short, the value of the Rental property was overvalued by
$34,500.00 which was prejudicial to the Appellant.
The Court overvalued the Appellant's vested savings
plan which the Plaintiff testified was worth $4,019.20 (R. at
617).

He produced a letter from the company (Defendant's Exhibit

17) which stated that under the Appellant's savings plan he had
$4,019.20 available and that the other funds shown on the Summary
of Account (Defendant's Exhibit 16) were not vested, so not
available

for withdrawal.

The letter

from the Company,

Defendant's Exhibit 17, is unambiguous and therefore, it was
error for the Court to find the savings plan to be worth
$9,466.00.
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The Court undervalued the household furnishings in the
possession of the Respondent which the Court valued at $5,000.00
in its Findings of Fact (Record at 257).

frhe Appellants total

value for household goods was $31,000.0Q

(R. at 555).

The

Respondent lumped everything together and assigned a purely
arbitrary figure of $10,000.00 for the itefns.
Exhibit 1.

See Defendant's

The Appellant's testimony as to the value of these

items should be afforded more weight than the Respondent's
testimony for several reasons:

First of all the Appellant listed

each item in detail, showing he had a greater familiarity with
the household

items than did the Respondent.

Second, the

Appellant testified that in placing a valu^ on the items in his
Exhibit 15 he did some checking including fnaking phone calls to
department stores (R. at 555) which the Respondent did not do.
The Appellant demonstrated
testimony

lacked credibility.

tfyat the Respondent's

For example the

Respondent

submitted as Exhibit "8" her list of monthly expenses.

Cross

examination revealed that nearly all of the expenses listed were
being

paid by her parents

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11).

(R. at 434, 435, 443, 444 and

Also the Respondent listed her car

expense at $400.00 per month although she dwned the car free and
clear (R. at 443).
The most revealing example of th^ Respondent's lack of
candor was her statement that she had never seen the offer on the
Rental property which document was intrbduced as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 13 (R. at 473).

She repeatedly stated that there had
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never been any written offer from the tenants, only oral offers
(R. at 473, 474). Her counsel later admitted that the Respondent
herself delivered the offer to Appellant's counsel (R. at 551).
It is inconceivable in light of such blatant inconsistencies that
Respondent's testimony and valuations should be afforded the same
weight as the Appellant's.
As stated previously
standard of living.

the parties enjoyed a high

It is inconceivable that the furnishings of

a house with five bedrooms, three and a half baths, formal living
room, formal dining room, TV room, kitchen and laundry would
contain furnishings worth only $10,000.00, let alone $5,000.00.
The Court however, valued the Respondent's household
furnishings at $5,000.00, a figure which was never suggested by
either party and has no basis in the record (R. at 258).
The Court also substantially overvalued the household
possessions

in the Appellant's possession.

The Appellant

testified that the only joint property in his possession was
camera equipment, valued by the Court in its Findings of Fact at
a zero value. (R. at 257).
submitted her Exhibit

M

The Respondent, on the other hand

l" which makes the following conclusory

statement:
Household furnishings, fixtures, appliances,
etc. in possession of Eddie Ebbert, including
two book cases — est. $5,000.00
No further details were offered by way of testimony or
exhibits to support this figure.
To find that the Appellant had $5,000.00 worth of joint
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property in his possession was clearly against the preponderance
of the evidence and was an abuse of discretion.
From a reading of the Court's Ruling it seems that the
Court did not consider dividing the property evenly because of
the fact that it felt that "a overwhelming majority of the assets
of the parties were a direct result of gifts from the Defendant's
family." (R. at 329) However, this is not true according to the
Defendant's Exhibit "2" the Respondent's parents contributed a
total of $80,333.00 during the marriage.

The Appellant would

have had to earn only $10,000.00 per year (R. at 525) to equal
what the Respondent's family contributed, and the evidence is
clear that the Appellant made far more than $10,000.00 per year.
Although the Court has considerable

latitude in

dividing the parties' assets, the Court abused its discretion in
awarding 97% of the assets to the Respondeat.

Case law does not

support such a claim.
Most commonly an award of more than 50% of the marital
assets is made in lieu of alimony where a wife has supported the
marriage as a homemaker and has no earning capacity.

Workman v

Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982), Beals v Beals, 610 P.2d 326
(Utah 1980), King v. King, 717 P.2d 715 (1986).
An award of more than 50% of the marital assets is also
made for other equitable reasons.

See Kerr v Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380

(Utah 1980), and Jesperson v Jesperson, 610, P.2d 326 (Utah
1980).
None of the factors listed in those cases as ground for
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awarding a party more than 50% of the marital assets are relevant
to the case at bar.
In short there was simply no basis for the Court to
award a majority of the assets to the Respondent.

To do so was

an abuse of discretion, extremely prejudicial to the Appellant
and the Appellant is entitled to receive a judgment equal to his
50% of the total marital assets in the amount of $90,740.00.
IX.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AWARD
THE APPELLANT ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR
THE APPEAL.
Utah law provides that attroney's fees may be granted
on the basis of reasonableness and need.

Attorney's fees have

been awarded where supported by evidence that one party is
relatively more able to pay than the other party.

For example,

in Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2 1201 (Utah 1983) the court granted
attorney's fees to the Plaintiff where the Plaintiff demonstrated
need, and the Defendant demonstrated "realtive superiority of
ability

to pay."

Savage at 1206.

The facts stated above

demonstrated that in the case at bar the Respondent is in a far
better position to pay than is the Appellant and that the failure
to prepare

proper

findings was that of the Respondent.

Therefore, the Appellant should be awarded his fees herein.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons heretofore set forth either:
1.

Custody should be awarded to the Appellant and a

new trial should be granted on the issues of support and property
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division, or
2.

A new trial should be granted on all issues.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //&• dfry of May, 1987.
LAW)OFFICE OF LOWELL V.
SUMMERHAYS

Lowpll V. Summerhays^
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EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT,
AFFIDAVIT OF KENN M. HANSON
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
BARBARA ANN EBBERT,
Case No. 860229-CA
Defendant/Respondent.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, KENN M. HANSON, having been duly sworn do swear upon
my oath and state as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney and a member of the Utah

State Bar Association practicing law in the state of Utah.
2.

That I represented Appellant Eddie C. Ebbert at

and prior to trial in the above captioned divorce proceeding in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
3.

That I have personal knowledge of the comments and

actions hereinafter described.
1

4.

That the comments and actions of Judge Philip R.

Fishier strongly suggested Court bias from the commencement of
the Court proceedings and through the trial.
5.

That with respect to a hearing on one of the

proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law the Court
stated "I can't tell you how much my heart sank when I saw this
case on my law and motion calendar".
6.

That during the course of the divorce proceeding

there were numerous recesses called by the Court and subsequent
meetings in chambers.
7.

That during one of those meetings and prior to

trial, the Court made the comment regarding his proposed finding
for custody and Respondent's proposed move out of state as
follows:

"She is going to have custody; that's the way it's

gonna' be.

I am not going to restrict her right to travel

anywhere".
8.

That the Court explained his proposed judgment

during the same meeting in chambers by referencing a custody
award which had been made to the Court's bother's wife.
9.

That the Court further described his brother's

case as one (like the instant case) where the wife took the
children out of state after receiving custody.
10.

That the Court indicated to Affiant in this same

meeting the opinion that his brother had no recourse to said
move, and neither should the Appellant.
2

11.

That there were times throughout the trial when

the Court's gestures were not reflected on the record, but which
gestures where indicative of the Court's.attitude and bias.
12.

That

in one such demonstration

the Court's

gestures were so poignant as to coerce the Appellant to withdraw
testimony regarding the children's physical health and to bring
the trial to a premature end.
13.

That the specific instance hereinabove described

(sans gestures) can be found in the trial transcript at record
page 624, lines 6-18.
14.

That during the course of this discussion the

Court gestured in a dramatic, overbearing and intimidating
fashion, whereupon the Court came right out of the bench,
extending his arm and pointing his finger a^ the Appellant.
15.

That the Court called a recess upon this outburst

requesting Counsel to come into chambers.
16.

That in chambers the Court said "Barbara Ebbert

may be a lot of things, but she's not a child abuser."
17.

That the Court further stated in that meeting: "I

have to live with my decision.

Go out in the hall and advise Ed

about his next move."
18.

That the clear intent and Effect of this meeting

in chambers was for the Court to get Affiant to make Appellant
retract his statement.
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19.

That if called, Affiant would and could testify

competently to the above described facts.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYTH NOT.

?

DATED this

day of May, 1987

Kenn M. Hanson

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
APPEARED BEFORE ME, Kenn M. Hanson stated that he is
the signer of the foregoing affidavit and that the contents
therein are true to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief.
DATED this

^ ^

day of May, 1986.

tfOTA
Residing at

My Commission Expires

*{Uti&'7/[J
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AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, EDDIE CLARENCE

EBBERT,

do

upon

my

oath

swear

and state as follows:
1.
and

May

That between
9,

1987, my

the

dates

of

September

15, 1986

ex-wife Barbara Ebbert, has refused

to allow me to visit with the

children

on

fourteen

(14)

separate occasions.
2.

In December 1986 the plane fare alone for Christmas

visitation cost me $588.00.
3.

That for me to travel to Colorado Springs, Colorado,

by air; car rental, hotel room, food

and

visitation

with

the children, it would cost at least $250.00.

/ / ^

DATED this //_ day of May, 1987.

Eddie Clarence Ebbert
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this //day

of May, 1987.

My Commission Empires:
Notary Publi

Residing at:

„ 5^rj£/' £%L&>

(6^^tJ^,7

! W 1 6 1986
H DiXonHindie>XlerK3roD^ T Cour

JAMES P. COWLEY (0739)
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300
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Attorneys for Defendant
BARBARA ANN EBBERT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT,
:

FINDINGS OF FACT

AND

Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
vs.
Civil No. D 85-2144

BARBARA ANN EBBERT,
Defendant.

[

Judge Philip R. Fishier

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, Judge of the above-entitled Court
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Friday, November 8, 1985.

The

Plaintiff and Defendant were both present and were both represented by counsel.

A stipulated settlement was reached between

the parties on November 7, 1985, and the parties so advised
the Court and they stated the Stipulation for the record.
The parties were both sworn and examined, and exhibits were
received.
The parties were thereafter unable to agree upon the form
and substance of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-

-l-

ment and Decree of Divorce, and upon motion of counsel for
Defendant, the Stipulation was set aside and the matter was
set for trial at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 27,
1986.
The matter came on for trial on Thursday, March 27, 1986
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Philip R. Fishier,
Judge of the above-entitled court.

The parties were present

in person and both were represented by their counsel.
were called and examined.

Exhibits were received.

Witnesses

The Court

reviewed the matters on file, counsel for the parties made
closing arguments and the Court now makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant and Plaintiff are both actual and bona

fide residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and were
for more than three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other

in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on June 19, 1976 and have
since been husband and wife.
3.

Each party has treated the other cruelly, causing

the other to suffer great mental pain, anguish and duress.
4.
riage:

Two children have been born the issue of the marAnne Ebbert, born February 14, 1980, and Amy Ebbert,

born June 16, 1982.

The Defendant is a good mother and a fit

and proper person to have the care, custody and control of
said two children.
5.

The Plaintiff is in good health, able-bodied and

employed as a manufacturer's representative with net after
tax earnings (including the leasehold value of a company-owned
automobile furnished to the Plaintiff by his employer) of $24,000
per year.
6.

The Defendant is in good health, able-bodied and

is currently unemployed but has been employed and has certain
skills and is expected to earn a net after tax income of $700
per month.
7.

During the marriage, the parties have accumulated

the following assets and incurred the following liabilities
with a resulting net worth as indicate^:
Assets :
(a)

(b)

(c)

Residence occupied by Barbara Ebbert
at 7389 South 1710 East, fair
market value of $129,000, less contract balance of $85,000
Rental property at 7238 South
1710 East, fair market value
$79,000, less mortgage balance
of $44,000 and less tenant deposit
of $500

$ 43,950

34,500

Pots, pans, appliances, furniture
and utility utensils located in
residence occupied by Barbara
Ebbert

5,000

(d)

Painting by Salvadore Dali

1,200

(e)

Camera equipment and projector

-3-
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(f)

Patio Furnishings

500

(g)

Garden Implements

250

(h)

Cash on hand with Barbara (approx.)

1,500

(i)

Eddie Ebbert*s vested savings plan
with Allied Corporation as of
9/30/85

9,466

Household furnishings, fixtures,
appliances, etc. in possession
of Eddie Ebbert, including two
oak bookcases, etc.

5,000

(j)

(k)
(1)
ill

—

Barbara Ebbertfs clothing, personal
effects, jewelry, etc.

-0-

Eddie Ebbertfs clothing, personal
effects, jewelry, etc.

-0-
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$103,866
Liabilities:
(a)

Payable to Linnel McCullern for
counseling - Barbara and Eddie

$

1,300

t- ° *

< £<

(b)

Account payable to Chalk Garden -

I

1,900

U. -J

Barbara

it

500
(c) Account due ZCMI - Eddie
500
(d)

Account due Weinstocks - Eddie

(e)

Account due Sears - Eddie

(f)

Account due Colletts - Eddie

(g)

Account due Arthur Frank - Eddie

450
1,500
566
1,500
(h) Account due Mastercharge - Eddie
22
(i)

Account due Mountain Fuel - Eddie

(j)

Utah Power & Light - Eddie

65
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(k)

Westminster College - Eddie

(1)

Repayable to Eddie's father - Eddie

672
1,200
$ 10,175

Total Assets

$ 103,866

Less Liabilities
Net Worth
8.

(10,175)
$

93,691

During the marriage, the Defendant's parents made

cash gifts to the parties as follows:

1977

in

•

$

2,750

1978

2,627

1979

570

1980

1,417

1981

2,000

1982

11,000

1983

20,031

1984

41,700

1985

17,838
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1986 (To 3/25/86)

3,500
$

9.

93,433

The Defendant acquired the following assets prior

to marriage or by way of gift during the marriage:
(a)

China from Barbara's grandmother

(b)

Gorham silver service acquired prior to marriage

(c)

China acquired prior to marriage

-5-

(d) Miscellaneous items of china, crystal and
silver acquired prior to marriage

U)

(e)

San franciscan crystal acquired prior to
marriage

(f)

Crystal gifted to Barbara by her parents during marriage

(g)

Oak table and chairs gifted by Barbara's parents

(h)

Office furniture, currently being utilized by
Eddie, gifted by Barbara's father during
marriage

(i)

VCR gifted to Barbara by her parents during
marriage

(j)

1981 Buick Skylark gifted by Barbara's father
during marriage

(k)

Piano gifted to Barbara by her parents

—
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10.

Since October of 1985, Barbara Ebbert has utilized

resources provided by her mother and father to pay and discharge
the following debts that were incurred prior to the separation
of the parties:
Utah Power & Light

$

115

Salt Lake City Water

110

Salt Lake City Sewer

143

Taxes on the Residential Property
occupied by Mrs. Ebbert

1,200

Note payable to Continental Bank

3,500

Account Payable to ZCMI

135

Chalk Garden

800

First Interstate Bank

465

-6-

Weinstocks

260

Rowland Hall

2,063

Mountain States Telephone

200

AT&T

65
Total

11.

9,056

$

1,900

The following debts remain unpaid:
Chalk Garden
Linnel McCullem for counseling

1,300

Eddie's account with ZCMI

500

Eddie's account with Weinstoc|ks

500

Eddie's account with Sears

450

Eddie's account with Collettsi
Eddie's account with Arthur Ijrank
Eddie's Mastercharge

1,500
566
1,500

Eddie's Mountain Fuel account

22

Eddie's Utah Power & Light account

65

Eddie's account with Westminster
Repayable to Eddie's father
12.

$

672
1,200

The Plaintiff and Defendant each inadvertently paid

real property taxes on the property described in paragraph
7(a) for calendar year 1985 in the amount of $1,200 each.

The

payment by the Plaintiff was in error and a duplicate payment, and the same should, upon application to Salt Lake County,
be recovered.

13.

The Defendant currently resides in Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, but is intending to move during the summer of
1986 to Colorado Springs.
14.

The Plaintiff should enjoy reasonable but carefully

defined rights of visitation with the two children who are
issue of the marriage.
15.

Based upon the respective earnings of the parties

as set forth in paragraph 5 and 6 above, a reasonable amount
of child support to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant
is $325 per month per child.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Each party is entitled to and should be granted a

Judgment and Decree divorcing that party from the other.

The

same should become final immediately upon the entry thereof.
2.

The care, custody and control of the two minor child-

ren who are issue of the marriage should be granted to Defendant, reserving to the Plaintiff the right to visit said children at all reasonable but well-defined times and places.

The

Plaintiff should be accorded his parental entitlements with
respect to the minor children such as the right to attend parentteacher conferences and to receive notice of illness or injury
to either of said children.
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3.

The Plaintiff should be required to pay to the Defen-

dant as child support for the use and benefit of the two minor
children the sum of $325 per month for each of said children,
with the first payment thereof being due on or before April
1, 1986, and a like payment being due on or before the first
day of each and every month thereafter, pending further order
of the Court.
4.

In addition to the child support provided for in

paragraph 3 above, the Plaintiff should provide the following
additional support for the two minor children:
(a)

For so long only as the Plaintiff has a duty

to support the minor children and for so long as the same
is available to the Plaintiff through his place of employment, he should maintain full health and accident insurance
coverage for the benefit and use of the two minor children,
and they should be covered thereunder and thereby for
all medical and hospital expenses and other health and
accident coverage that is available to them through the
Plaintiff ! s insurance.

To the extent that the children

incur hospital, health and medical expenses that are not
covered by the Plaintiff's insurance, the Plaintiff and
Defendant should each be required to pay one-half thereof.
(b)

The Plaintiff should maintain insurance upon

his life with death benefits payable to the Defendant
as trustee for the use and benefit of the children to

insure support for the children in the event of Plaintiff's
death.

The original amount thereof should be $100,000

but may be reduced proportionate to the reduction of the
Plaintiff's child support obligation.
5.

The Plaintiff should be required to pay the Defendant

alimony of one dollar per year for a period of two years.
6.

There should be an equitable division of the assets

accumulated during the marriage (giving consideration to the
fact that a substantial portion of the assets resulted from
gifts made by the Defendant's parents), and the Court should
fix the responsibility for discharge of the outstanding obligations of the parties.
7.

The Plaintiff should be given the right to recover

from Salt Lake County the duplicate payment of taxes upon the
Salt Lake County property described in paragraph 7(a) above
in the amount of $1,200.
8.

The parties should each be required to pay and dis-

charge their own attorney's fees and costs of court in this
action.
DATED this

/S

day of £/7tfO*

1986.

BY TOE COURT:

,MML

TISHLER, DISTRICT JUDGE
ATTEST
H DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
kkputy CierK

-10-

^uuuumtwi

Salt Lake Ci+y, Utah

MA^j l 6 1986
H D ' x c \ H i n d ' ^ y , Clerk 3rc Dist Cour;
JAMES P. COWLEY (0739)
By
k
r y ^ ^ D
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
Dfeputy Oerk
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300

Attorneys for Defendant
BARBARA ANN EBBERT
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT,
JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D 85-2144

BARBARA ANN EBBERT,

Judge Philip R. Fishier

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, Judge of the above-entitled Court
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Friday, November 8, 1985. The
Plaintiff and Defendant were both present and were both represented by counsel.

A stipulated settlement was reached between

the parties on November 7, 1985, and the parties so advised
the Court and they stated the Stipulation for the record.
The parties were both sworn and examined, and exhibits were
received.
The parties were thereafter unable to agree upon the form
and substance of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
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ment and Decree of Divorce, and upon motion of counsel for
Defendant, the Stipulation was set aside and the matter was
set for trial at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 27,
1986.
The matter came on for trial on Thursday, March 27, 1986
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Philip R. Fishier,
Judge of the above-entitled court.

The parties were present

in person and both were represented by their counsel.
were called and examined.

Exhibits were received.

Witnesses

The Court

reviewed the matters on file, counsel for the parties made
closing arguments to the Court and the Court, having heretofore
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
now makes and enters its
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Each party is given and granted a Judgment and Decree

divorcing that party from the other.

The same shall become

final immediately upon the entry hereof.
2.

The care, custody and control of the two minor chil-

dren who are issue of the marriage is awarded to the Defendant,
subject to the Plaintiff's parental rights, including but not
limited to attending parent teacher conferences and including
the right to receive immediate notice from the Defendant of
any illness or injury of either one of said children.

The

Plaintiff is given and granted the right to visit with said
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children at the times and places and subject to the terms and
conditions relating thereto all as set forth in Exhibit A attached to this Judgment and by this reference incorporated
herein.
3.

The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as and for

child support for the use and benefit of the two children who
are issue of the marriage, the sum of $325 per month per child.
Payments of $325 shall be made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant
on or before April 1st and April 15, 1986 and on or before
the 1st and 15th day of each month thereafter.
4.

In addition to the child support provided for in

paragraph 3 above, the Plaintiff shall provide the following
additional support for the minor children:
(a)

For so long only as the Plaintiff has a duty

to support the minor children and for so long as the same
is available to the Plaintiff through his place of employment, Plaintiff will maintain the parties' minor children
on his health and accident insurance coverage.

To the

extent that the cost of medical and health care for the
minor children exceeds and/or is not covered and not paid
for by Plaintiff's health and accident insurance, then
one-half of all amounts not paid for by said insurance
shall be paid by the Plaintiff and the other one-half
shall be paid by the Defendant.
(b)

The Plaintiff shall maintain insurance upon

his life with death benefits payable to the Defendant

(as trustee for the use and benefit of the children) in
the original initial amount of $100,000, and the Plaintiff shall pay the premiums and other costs incident thereto
and associated therewith.

The Plaintiff is given and

granted the right to reduce the coverage each year commencing with calendar year 1987 with the reduction to
be in proportion to the amount by which the Plaintiff
has discharged his total child support obligations.

This

duty of the Plaintiff to provide such insurance is for
the purpose of assuring the Defendant and the minor children of resources alternative to child support in the
event of the Plaintiff's death.
5.

The Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff is ordered

and directed to pay to her as alimony the sum of one dollar
for calendar year 1986 and the sum of one dollar for calendar
year 1987.

The Plaintifffs duty to pay alimony shall terminate

on December 31, 1987 unless the court has prior thereto extended
or enlarged the same.
6.

The following described assets are awarded to the

Plaintiff as his sole and separate property and free and clear
of any right, title, and interest, claim or equity therein
or thereto by the Defendant:
(a)

Rental property and its contents and fixtures

located therein at 7238 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City,
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Utah with a fair market value of $179,000, less a mortgage balance of approximately $44,000 with a net value
of approximately $35,000 and subject to the cleaning deposit, advance rents and other deposits made by the tenants
who are currently in possession of said property.
(b)

Camera equipment and projector.

(c)

All of the savings plans, stock options, profit

sharing, pension plans and retirement benefits earned
by the Plaintiff as a result of his employment with the
Allied Corporation.
(d)

All of the household furnishings, fixtures,

appliances, sporting equipment, tools and utensils in
the Plaintiff's possession and including cash and certificates of deposit in his possession and including bookcases
in his possession and including his clothing and personal
effects that are still at the residence occupied by the
Defendant and including a desk and Plaintiff's childhood
books located at said residence.
(e)

A real property tax refund in the amount of

$1,200 on the property identified in paragraph 7(a) below
to the extent that said taxes were for calendar year 1985
paid twice and to the extent that the Plaintiff can obtain
from the taxing authorities a refund of the $1,200 duplicate payment.

(The Defendant shall cooperate with the

Plaintiff with respect to this matter.)
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7.

The following described assets are awarded to Defen-

dant as her sole and separate property and free and clear of
any right, title, interest, claim or equity therein or thereto
by Plaintiff:
(a)

Real property at 7389 South 1710 East, Salt

Lake City, Utah, more particularly described as a residence and lot, with a fair market: value of $129,000, and
a contract balance of $85,050 with an equity of approximately $43,950.
(b)

The Defendant's clothing and her personal effects

and jewelry and all of the household furnishings, fixtures,
tools, equipment, art objects, garden tools, lawn mowers,
silverware, crystal, china and personal property in possession of the Defendant and/or located at the residence
occupied by her and including all cash in her possession
and all property that was accumulated prior to or during
the marriage and not specifically and expressly identified
and awarded to the Plaintiff pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph 6 above.
8.

The Plaintiff shall pay and discharge the following

obligations and shall save and hold the Defendant harmless
therefrom.
(a)

Account balance at ZCMI

(b)

Account balance at Weinstocks.

(c)

Account balance at Sears.
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(d)

Account balance at Collects.

(e)

Account balance at Arthur Frank.

(f)

Mastercharge balance.

(g)

Mountain Fuel Supply acdount

(i)

Utah Power & Light account.

(j)

Account at Westminster College.

(k)

Amount payable to Plaintiff's father.

(1)

$650 of the $1,300 due and owing to Linnell
McCullem.

(m)

The mortgage balance due on the property located

at 7238 South 1710 East, together with all amounts, if
any, due and owing to the rental tpenants who are currently
in possession of said property.
(n)

All debts, liabilities ^nd charges incurred

by the Plaintiff subsequent to the separation of the parties in June of 1985 and not specifically herein required
to be paid by the Defendant.
(o)

The attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff

in this action and all costs and expenses incident thereto
and associated therewith and resulting therefrom.
9.

The Defendant shall pay and discharge the following

obligations and shall save and hold the Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
(a)

$650 of the $1,300 due and owing to Linnell
McCullem.

(b)

Account balance at Chalk Garden of $1,900.

(c)

The mortgage balance on the residence at 7389
South 1710 East.

(d)

All debts, liabilities and charges incurred
by the Defendant subsequent to the separation
of the parties in June of 1985 and not specifically herein required to be paid by the Plaintiff.

(e)

The attorney's fees incurred by the Defendant
in this action and all costs and expenses incident thereto and associated therewith and resulting therefrom.

10.

If both parties agree, they may file joint federal

and state income tax returns for calendar year 1985 and, in
that event, the parties shall each pay one-half of any additional taxes that are due and, in the event of a refund, they
shall divide the same evenly between them.

If the parties

do not agree upon such joint returns, then they may file separate returns and, in that event, they shall be responsible
for their own separate taxes and shall be entitled to their
own separate refunds, if any.
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11.

The parties are ordered and directed to take the

actions and execute and deliver documents necessary to implement this Judgment and Decree of Divorc^.
DATED this

/£

of f^A^A
flttu*
day of

,U
1986

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK

(••••••

K ^/rUflxo
©eouty Clerk
RICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I herewith certify that I caused a true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE to be served upon:
Kenn M. Hanson
740 East 3900 South
Murray, Utah

84107

by mailing him a copy thereof, postage prepaid, on the
day of April, 1986.

pL^
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Exhibit A to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce
Civil No. D 85-2144 - Ebbert vs. Ebbert

Plaintiffs Visitation Rights
With Respect to the Two Minor Children
Custody of Which Has Been Awarded to the Defendant

While the Defendant is still residing in Utah
and prior to her permanent relocation to Colorado,
the Plaintiff shall be entitled to visit with the children
on alternate weekends, commencing at 5:00 p.m. on Friday
evening and continuing to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday evening,
with the Plaintiff to have the liberty of taking the children with him during that time period. The Plaintiff's
first weekend of the described visitation shall be the
weekend commencing April 11, 1986.
The Defendant shall have the children available to
be picked up by the Plaintiff at the designated time and
on the weekends scheduled. The Plaintiff shall pick up
the children and return them as scheduled. If, for any
reason, the Plaintiff does not or cannot: exercise the
visitation for any specified weekend, the Plaintiff shall
give the Defendant notice thereof not later than 6:00
p.m. on the Wednesday preceding the Friday when the scheduled visitation is to commence. If the Plaintiff gives
the Defendant such notice, then, unless the Defendant
agrees otherwise, the Plaintiff shall have forfeited his
visitation for the entire weekend. If the Plaintiff fails
to give such notice of cancellation and also fails to
appear before 5:30 p.m., then, unless Defendant agrees
otherwise, the Plaintiff shall have forfeited his visitation rights for the entire weekend.
After the Plaintiff and the minor children have relocated in Colorado (expected during the summer of 1986),
the Plaintiff's right to visit with said children shall
be as follows and is subject to the express terms herein:
(a) Thursday and Friday of Thanksgiving weekend
for calendar year 1986 and the same two days on each
even numbered calendar year thereafter.
(b) Saturday and Sunday of Thanksgiving weekend
for calendar year 1987 and the same two days on each
odd numbered calendar year thereafter.
(c) Pre-Christmas holidays for calendar year
1986 and for each even numbered calendar year thereafter. Pre-Christmas holidays is defined to mean
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a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the second
day after the beginning of the children's Christmas
vacation and continuing to 12:00 noon on Christmas
Day.
(d) Post-Christmas holidays for calendar year
1987 and for each odd numbered calendar year thereafter. Post-Christmas holidays is defined to mean
a period of time commencing at 12:00 noon on December
25th and continuing to 7:00 p.m. on December 31st.
(e) Easter weekend in calendar year 1987 and
on each odd numbered calendar year thereafter. East
weekend is defined to mean from 6:00 p.m. on Friday
evening before Easter through 7:00 p.m. on Easter
Day.
(f) During Colorado's Education Association
recess (if any) in 1987 and in each odd numbered
calendar year thereafter. The Colorado Education
Association school recess is defined to be a period
commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the first day of the recess
and ending at 7:00 p.m. on the day prior to the day
school resumes.
(g) President's Day, which is defined to mean
a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the day
before President's Day and terminating at 7:00 p.m.
on President's Day.
(h) Memorial Day, which is defined to mean
a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the day
before Memorial Day and terminating at 7:00 p.m. on
Memorial Day.
(i) The children's birthdays in calendar year
1986 and on even numbered calendar years thereafter.
The birthday visitation is defined to mean a period
of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the day prior
to the children's birthdays and ending at 7:00 p.m.
on the children's birthdays.
(j) Summer vacation, which is defined to mean
a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on July
3rd and terminating at 7:00 p.m. oil July 25th. If,
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and to the extent the Plaintiff exercises his rights
to summer vacation for both children for the full
period of time herein set forth, then the child support for each of said children for the month of July
otherwise due and owing by the Plaintiff to the Defendant shall be reduced by one-third for said month.
(k) Father's Day weekend which is defined to
be a time period commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday
before Father's day and ending at 7:00 p.m. on Father's

Day.
With respect to visitation after the Plaintiff and
minor children have relocated in Colorado, the Plaintiff
may exercise the visitation rights described above in
either Colorado or Utah, subject to the following terms
and conditions:
(a) If the Plaintiff picks the children up
at the Defendant's residence, he must do so promptly
at the hour of 6:00 p.m. on the scheduled day and
must return them promptly at the hour of 7:00 p.m.
on the scheduled day. If the Plaintiff intends to
pick the children up at their place of residence
in the Colorado Springs area, then he shall give
the Defendant written notice two weeks in advance
of the scheduled commencement of the visitation period.
(b) The Plaintiff may exercise his right of
visitation in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the Defendant
shall permit the children to be transported by a
common carrier to Salt Lake City, Utah.
(i) The common carrier transport must
be proper and suitable for transporting the
children, given their ages.
(ii) The Plaintiff must be present at the
children's arrival in Salt Lake City, Utah to
greet them and care for them upon their arrival.
(iii) The Plaintiff must provide to the
Defendant prepaid tickets for utilization by
the children in traveling to Salt Lake City,
Utah. The prepaid tickets must be provided
by the Plaintiff to the Defendant not later
than ten days prior to the date upon which the
visitation is scheduled.
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(iv) The transportation must be so arranged
by the Plaintiff that the children will arrive
in Salt Lake City, Utah not earlier than 6:00
p.m. and not later than 10:00 p.m. on the first
day of the scheduled visitation and be returned
to the Defendant in Colorado Springs, Colorado
not later than 7:00 p.m. on the concluding day
of the visitation.
(v) If suitable transportation for the
children is not available direct from Colorado
Springs to Salt Lake City, Utah then the Defendant shall, at her cost and expense, be responsible for placing the children on the common
carrier in Denver Colorado for direct transportation to Salt Lake City, Utah. If return transportation is not available direct from Salt
Lake City to Colorado Springs, then the Defendant shall be responsible for meeting the children in Denver and transporting them from there
to Colorado Springs.
(vi) All transportation arranged by the
Plaintiff must be reasonable with respect to
the children's ages, and the Defendant is not
expected to subject the children to any unnecessary and unreasonable transportation risks.
(vii) The Plaintiff shall keep the Defendant fully informed and advised as to all arrangements with respect to visitation, including
date and time of pickup, date and time of return,
an itinerary of where the children will be,
including addresses and phone numbers where
they may be reached by the Defendant during
the entire visitation period.
In addition to the visitation herein above set forth,
the Defendant shall cooperate with the Plaintiff in accomodating free and open communication by the Plaintiff with
the children through the use of telephones, telegrams
and mail.
The Plaintiff may visit with the children in Colorado
on dates other than as specifically scheduled upon giving
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the Defendant two weeks written notice of Plaintiff's
intended additional visitation with the children, and
such visitation shall be limited to afternoon and evening
visits and overnight visits of not more than one night
and provided that the visitation shall not interfere with
the children's school and provided further that this additional visitation may not be exercised more frequently
than 24 hours in any month.
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary,
the Plaintiff may not exercise any visitation rights at
such times as will in any way interfere with the children's
schooling.
The Plaintiff may exercise visitation rights other
than as herein expressly set forth only with the prior,
express approval and agreement of the Defendant.
The Plaintiff is expected to exercise the visitation
rights herein granted to him in a reasonable and responsible fashion. If the children are ill or if there are
other valid reasons why the Defendant believes a particular
visitation is not in the best interest of the children
or will be hazardous or threatening to their physical
or mental health, then the Defendant may decline the visitation rights by giving reasonable written notice thereof
to the Plaintiff and setting forth the reasons therefor.
Neither party shall, by their words, conduct, act
or otherwise express, intimate or indicate any derrogatory,
defamatory or denigrating remark about the other parent.
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